Social Evolution by Gaus, Gerald & Thrasher, John
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
Philosophy Faculty Books and Book Chapters Philosophy
11-27-2012
Social Evolution
Gerald Gaus
University of Arizona
John Thrasher
Chapman University, thrasheriv@chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/philosophy_books
Part of the History of Philosophy Commons, Other Philosophy Commons, and the Other
Sociology Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Books and Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thrasher, John, and Gerald Gaus. “Social Evolution.” The Routledge Companion to Social and Political Philosophy. Edited by Gerald Gaus
and Fred D’Agostino, Routledge, 2013, pp. 643-655.
Social Evolution 
Gerald Gaus and John Thrasher 
 
It is a mater of dispute how far back evolutionary explanations of social order should be 
traced. Evolutionary ideas certainly appear in the work of the ancient Greek philosophers, 
but it seems reasonable to identify the origins of modern evolutionary thinking in the 
eighteenth century natural histories of civil society such as Rousseau’s Discourse on the 
Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men (1750, Part III), Adam Ferguson’s An 
Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776, 
Book III). In these eighteenth century works, the explanation of current social institutions 
as an unplanned and generally adaptive development out of earlier and simpler 
arrangements gained traction. Germany too had a tradition of Naturphilosophie employing 
general evolutionary ideas, as well as Hegelian-influenced thinking on the development of 
societies.  In 1863, four years after Darwin’s Origins of the Species August Schleicher’s 
Die Darwinscbe Theorie und die Sprachwissenschaf, drew on these traditions as well as 
Darwin’s Origins of the Species to present an evolutionary account of the development of 
families of languages (Taub, 1993), an endeavor that was carried on by a number of 
scholars in the later part of the nineteenth century. 
 
1. Spencer 
Although Herbert Spencer is generally known as a “Social Darwinist” his early 
evolutionary account predates The Origin of the Species. In an 1857 article in the 
Westminster Review Spencer sketches a comprehensive account of evolution of the 
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inorganic, organic, and human and social realms. “In respect to that progress which 
individual organisms display in the course of their evolution” Spencer argues, the 
investigations of “Wolff, Goethe, and von Baer, have established the truth that the series 
of changes gone through during the development of a seed into a tree, or an ovum into an 
animal, constitute an advance from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure” 
(1857, ¶2). He continues:  
 
On passing from Humanity under its individual form, to Humanity as socially 
embodied, we find the general law still more variously exemplified. The change from 
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous is displayed in the progress of civilization as a 
whole, as well as in the progress of every nation; and is still going on with increasing 
rapidity. As we see in existing barbarous tribes, society in its first and lowest form is a 
homogeneous aggregation of individuals having like powers and like functions: the 
only marked difference of function being that which accompanies difference of sex. 
Every man is warrior, hunter, fisherman, tool-maker, builder; every woman performs 
the same drudgeries. Very early, however, in the course of social evolution, there arises 
an incipient differentiation between the governing and the governed….no sooner does 
the originally-homogeneous social mass differentiate into the governed and the 
governing parts, than this last exhibits an incipient differentiation into 
religious and secular—Church and State; while at the same time there begins to be 
differentiated from both, that less definite species of government which rules our daily 
intercourse—a species of government which, as we may see in heralds’ colleges, in 
books of the peerage, in masters of ceremonies, is not without a certain embodiment 
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of its own. Each of these is itself subject to successive 
differentiations….Simultaneously there has been going on a second differentiation of 
a more familiar kind; that, namely, by which the mass of the community has been 
segregated into distinct classes and orders of workers. While the governing part has 
undergone the complex development above detailed, the governed part has undergone 
an equally complex development, which has resulted in that minute division of labour 
characterizing advanced nations (1857, ¶¶ 8-9).  
 
This account is not selectionist, in the sense of postulating a filtering mechanism (such as 
“survival of the fittest”) that eliminates, say, societies that are not heterogeneous in favor 
of those that are. Instead, Spencer conceives of evolution as a law of increasing complexity 
of all things based on the “all-pervading principle” that “Every active force produces more 
than one change—every cause produces more than one effect” (1867, ¶22).  Evolution, 
then, is a process of increasing complexity over time.   
 In his 1860 essay on “The Social Organism” Spencer makes much of the idea that 
societies, like individual organisms, “spontaneously evolved” to form complex systems of 
interaction characterized by the division of labor (1860, ¶3). For Spencer, the “social 
organism” is itself subject to evolutionary developments as a separate entity from its 
constituent individuals, though individual and social organisms have distinct 
characteristics.  Some have taken Spencer’s belief in a developing social organism as 
evidence that Spencer was willing to sacrifice individuals for the sake of the greater social 
whole, but this is a mistake. In these initial statements of his social evolutionary views, 
competition between individuals and families for survival is not the driving force of social 
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evolution: it is a manifestation of the inner workings of all organisms toward more complex 
internal organizations and mutual dependence between the constituent elements.  
Ultimately, there is nothing very Darwinian in Spencer’s account.  Instead, it is an 
expression of a universal metaphysical principle characterizing all order, a general theory 
of development.  Moreover, the idea that societies could be understood as organisms with 
their own evolutionary tendencies was widespread in late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century thought, from Spencer to left-leaning reformers such as such as L.T. Hobhouse and 
even to anarchists like Peter Kropotkin (Gaus, 1983, chap. 2).  Evolution was in the air and 
developmental thinking can be found in a variety of different fields from Hegel at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century through Marx, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche in 
philosophy to the British Whig historians like Trevelyan and Acton and even into the 
understanding of the mind itself in the writing of Freud.  It was an age obsessed with 
understanding the progress of history and making sense of the historical laws of 
development, even independent of the influence of Darwin.  Indeed, Darwin can be seen, 
as a one of the most important and successful of these evolutionary thinkers of the period 
but in no sense was his approach unique.   
 
2. Darwin 
Darwin, unlike Spencer, was notoriously cautious in applying evolutionary principles to 
humans, and only does so in a systematic way in The Descent of Man in 1871 and, to a 
lesser extent, in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872.  In both 
works, he provides an evolutionary account of the development and importance of 
sympathy and moral sense.  In a crucial passage he seems to appeal both to direct 
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reciprocity (Darwin 1871, Chapter 5) and group selection (Darwin 1871, Chapter 3) in 
explaining the rise of sympathy:  
 
[a] we are led by the hope of receiving good in return to perform acts of sympathetic 
kindness to others; and there can be no doubt that the feeling of sympathy is much 
strengthened by habit. In however complex a manner this feeling may have originated, 
as it is one of high importance to all those animals which aid and defend each other, it 
will have been increased, through natural selection; [b] for those communities, which 
included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members, would flourish best 
and rear the greatest number of offspring (Darwin, 1871, 82). 
  
 Darwin’s passage raises a theoretical point that should be emphasized. Note that claim 
[a] is consistent with an account of natural selection that operates only at the level of 
individual organism: those who help others when they can expect help in return outcompete 
non-reciprocating egoists in the struggle for existence.  Organism A’s act f of helping B is 
to the evolutionary advantage of A if the expected benefits from future help by B exceed 
the costs of f to A (Henrich and Henrich, 2007, 42; Hamilton, 1964). So on this analysis 
sympathy, which can lead one to help another, does not produce (from an evolutionary 
point of view) genuine altruism, since f is to A’s long-term advantage.  On the other hand 
at [b] Darwin appears to be positing a group selection mechanism; communities composed 
of sympathetic individuals will outperform communities of egoists without sympathy. Here 
we confront great controversy. Although group selectionist accounts were widely accepted 
in the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, in the 1970s the idea 
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was discredited and, indeed, identified as simple and manifest error.  The problem is 
obvious: even if a group of sympathetic individuals outperform a group of non-sympathetic 
egoists, a non-sympathetic egoist within a group of sympathetic individuals will 
outperform the rest of their group. The free-riding non-reciprocator receives all the benefits 
of living in a sympathetic reciprocating group, but never has to bear any of the costs of 
reciprocating, in the sense of sacrificing some of its own fitness to help other group 
members.  If such defectors thrive in the group, they will eventually dominate it 
outcompeting the reciprocators.  In the last few decades, however, evolutionary theorists 
have reevaluated the possibility of group selection; under certain conditions it is certainly 
a theoretical, mathematical, possibility and may, indeed, be an important factor in cultural 
evolution (Sober and Wilson, 1999; Okasha, 2008; Boyd and Richerson, 2005).  It is 
important, however, to distinguish between group selection in cultural evolution and group 
selection in biological evolution.  The former operates on different principles than the latter 
and is considerably less controversial.  
 
3. The Late Nineteenth Century Debate: Competitive or Cooperative Evolution? 
The great debate in social and political philosophy in the late nineteenth century was not 
whether Darwin’s views were applicable to the study of society, but whether the study of 
social evolution appropriately stresses competition among individuals within a society, or 
the cooperative nature of successful societies—ideas, as we have just seen, that can be 
found side-by-side in Darwin.  Although Darwin was always generally cautious in his 
pronouncements, especially when they involved the application of his theory to human 
society, his views tended toward the competitive side of the debate.  It is important to stress 
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in this regard that Darwin’s key idea of the “struggle for existence” was itself taken over 
from Thomas Malthus’s 1798 essay on population, which stressed that social life is always 
a struggle between increasing population and the constraints on food supply. To give food 
to non-producer over a producer was to not only to increase the burdens on the food 
producers in their struggle for existence, but also to handicap society in it efforts to produce 
as a whole (Malthus, 1798, chap. III, ¶6; Ritchie, 1891, 2).  In a letter Darwin remarks 
“What a foolish idea seems to prevail in Germany on the connection between Socialism 
and Evolution through Natural Selection” (F. Darwin, 1887, 237). Yet, in the end, Darwin 
also provides support for a more cooperative reading as well: 
 
Important as the struggle for existence has been and even still is, yet as far as the highest 
part of man’s nature is concerned there are other agencies more important. For the 
moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the 
effects of habit, the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, &c., than through natural 
selection; though to this latter agency the social instincts, which afforded the basis for 
the development of the moral sense, may be safely attributed (Darwin, 1871, 404). 
  
Besides Spencer, who certainly became associated with the competitive interpretation, 
perhaps the most famous exponent of this view was William Graham Sumner.  According 
to Sumner, “man is born under the necessity of sustaining the existence he has received by 
an onerous struggle against nature, both to win what is essential to his life, and to ward off 
what is prejudicial to it” (1860, ¶2). The crux of this argument, though, is essentially 
Mathusian: our struggle is against nature and only derivatively against each other, as we 
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“are struggling each to win from nature the material goods necessary to support life, and 
are carrying on this struggle side by side…” (Sumner, 1881, ¶11). To Sumner, socialism 
simply was simply a sentimental philosophy that denied unpalatable reality.  For Sumner 
as for Spencer, the study of sociology was to help us cope with hard reality that nature 
confronts us with.  With Sumner we see an especially clear example of a fairly swift move 
from an account of social evolution to social policy, which could not negate the inherent 
competition among individuals. 
 The late nineteenth century response by those friendly to socialism was generally not 
to dismiss the relevance evolutionary analysis to social and political philosophy, but to 
insist on the social-cooperative interpretation.  In his important Darwinism and Politics 
(1891), D. G. Ritchie insisted that while an individual struggle for material existence may 
characterize lower levels of evolution, in advanced civilizations social evolution is moved 
by the selection of ideas as embodied in institutions that make for a cooperative order. 
Socialism, according to Ritchie, was the sort of arrangement that, in contrast to the laissez 
faire of Spencer and Sumner, is favored in advanced civilizations.  L.T. Hobhouse, one of 
the founders of the “new liberalism,” stressed the case for expanded poor relief, 
unemployment insurance, and old-age pensions. He also took an explicitly cooperative 
view of social evolution. Like Ritchie he insisted that the “higher” phases of social 
evolution are guided by a mental evolution—the evolution of a social mind.  He argued, 
“the turning point in the evolution of thought … is reached when the conception of the 
development of humanity enters into explicit consciousness as the directing principle of 
human endeavor” (1911, 155; see also Hobhouse, 1901). Hobhouse’s conception of the 
development of societies and thought towards higher stages of cooperation and more 
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reflective consciousness greatly influenced his student, Morris Ginsberg, who advocated 
evolutionary sociology in the first half of the twentieth century. Ginsberg believed that the 
outcome of social evolution is that “men have become increasingly conscious of a 
fundamental unity of purpose and a good common to all mankind” (1931, 223). Although 
Ritchie sought to make the much of his account consistent with a Darwinian orientation, 
this is not true of many other similar thinkers.  For the most part, these cooperative accounts 
are explicitly non-Darwinian; social evolution is viewed as a principle of development or 
“growth” in ways that are not radically different from Spencer’s pre-Darwinian 
formulation. 
 
4. F.A. Hayek 
 Although Ginsberg and a few others championed social evolutionary thought through the 
1930s and later, willingness to apply evolutionary analysis to societies and social policy 
radically dropped off after the first world war, and even more dramatically after the rise 
fascism.  The idea of struggle for existence or survival of the fittest were often depicted as 
imperialistic or aggressively nationalistic ideas; combined with the association of the social 
application of Darwinian principles with eugenics, social evolutionary thought was 
generally thought to be discredited in the early and mid-twentieth century (Hodgson and 
Thorbjørn, 2010: 16).  During the 1950s, when the idea of social evolution was deeply 
unpopular, Hayek started to revive the approach in his University of Chicago 
interdisciplinary seminar.  Participants in the seminar included the geneticist Seawall 
Wright, himself a group selectionist (Caldwell, 2004, 299).  This was the beginning of a 
number of works by Hayek in the 1960s and 1970s, wherein he developed a sophisticated 
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analysis of the relation between complex phenomena, spontaneous orders, and cultural 
evolution (Gaus, 2006).  These accounts employed selectionist ideas but were not directly 
Darwinian. 
 Hayek repeatedly refers to “the twin ideas of evolution and spontaneous order” (Hayek, 
1967c, 77; 1978b, 250; 1973, 23; 158; 1988, 146). The starting point is Hayek’s work on 
complex phenomena; in contrast to the relatively simple phenomena studied by classical 
mechanics, biological organisms and social orders are complex systems that give rise to 
emergent properties, which can only be predicted within very broad ranges (Hayek, 1967b). 
Throughout his long career — and certainly since the 1950s — Hayek’s overriding concern 
was the analysis of the emergent property he called “the order of actions”:  
 
It is the resulting overall order of actions but not the regularity of the actions of the 
separate individuals as such which is important for the preservation of the group; and 
a certain kind of overall order may in the same manner contribute to the survival of the 
members of the group whatever the particular rules of individual conduct that bring it 
about (1967c, 68).  
 
Hayek’s fundamental claim is that the survival of a society depends on the emergent 
property of orderly cooperation of different individuals, which has a complex relation to 
the rules of conduct individuals follow. Some theories of spontaneous order (e.g. 
economics) explain how the complex order of social actions can be self-organizing and 
self-maintaining — they are essentially what Hayek calls “models” of the complex 
phenomenon of the social order of actions, providing general accounts of how the elements 
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relate (Hayek, 1967a, 14ff).  But to understand the workings of a complex social order of 
actions—spontaneously organized and self-regulating complex phenomena— is, still, 
essentially a static explanation.  Hayek is so attracted to evolutionary accounts of the order 
of actions because they hold out the promise of providing general explanations of the 
alteration and development of complex orders without needing the assumption that anyone 
fully understands the working of the order. As Hayek sees it, evolutionary accounts provide 
the real alternative to design or “constructivist theories” (Hayek 1973, Chapter 1).   
Evolutionary accounts articulate precisely the type of explanations based on the principles 
of change, rather than the prediction of system states, that are appropriate to complex 
systems (Hayek, 1967b, 31ff.).  In biology, Darwinian theory allows us to understand the 
principles that regulate the development of species, shows us that some developments are 
outside the possible range of possible values (e.g. that horses will suddenly give birth to 
winged offspring), but it is unable to generate specific predictions about the future of 
individuals or species (Hayek, 1967b).  Hayek believes that the same types of explanations 
are appropriate in other complex systems like the economy or society as a whole.  
 In Hayek’s social evolutionary analysis, then, the explanandum (that which is to be 
explained) is the rise and development of an emergent property, viz., the social order of 
actions. As Hayek says, “the selection process will operate on the order as a whole” (1967c, 
71). This is social order of actions is what Hayek calls the “Great Society”: an overall 
spontaneous order of adaptations that allows for coordinated action (Hayek, 1973, 2ff.).  The 
explanans (that which does the explaining) is an evolutionary account whereby the rules 
and institutions that give rise to this order (i.e., this emergent property) are selected via a 
competition within and among social orders. The emergent property, we have seen, arises 
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out of a system of rules; therefore their constituent rules and institutions determine the 
competition among these social orders as they operate in specific environments. 
Constituent rules and institutions differentiate social orders; variation in the rules and 
institutions can provide a competitive advantage in the competition between social orders, 
leading to selection of a social order of actions with certain sets of rules. 
   Hayek suggests a number of selection mechanisms, one of which of group survival. 
 He argues that: 
 
The rules of conduct have … evolved because the groups who practiced them were 
more successful and displaced others. They were rules which, given the environment 
in which men lived, secured that a greater number of the groups or individuals who 
practiced them would survive (Hayek, 1973, 18; see also Hayek, 1988, 25). 
 
This passage presents difficulties. By simply talking of “groups,” and then adding at the 
close that “greater number of the groups or individuals” survive, Hayek appears to be 
directly falling prey to problems of group selection and collective action. It looks as if 
Hayek is claiming that an individual’s chance of survival is maximized if she belongs to a 
group that maximizes its own chance of survival (Hayek, 1967c, 72). But this raises 
familiar problems of collective action and the rationality of free-riding that we saw in §2. 
If individuals are confronting prisoner’s dilemmas, it may be rational for each person not 
to do the thing that is good for the group, even though this leads to a situation that is 
disadvantageous for all.  One of the lessons of game theory is that what is good for the 
group may not be rational for any particular person in the group.   
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 Hayek also, however, writes that a person’s “thinking and acting are governed by rules 
which have by a process of selection been evolved in the society in which he lives” (Hayek, 
1973, 11. Emphasis added). Understood thus, it looks now as if his project is to explain 
how each rule (not the order of actions itself) evolved within the society. That this project 
may rely not only to the rule’s ability to produce a competitive order of actions, but the 
rule attractiveness to individuals who live under it, is suggested by Hayek’s remark that 
“[t]he competition on which the process of selection rests must be understood in the widest 
sense. It involves competition between organized and unorganized groups no less than 
competition between individuals” (Hayek, 1960, 37. Emphasis added.) This stress on 
individual competition and the evolution of rules suggests that, instead of a competition 
between social orders, Hayek has in mind a competition between individuals within a social 
order that leads to the selection and evolution of rules. So we seem to have two evolutionary 
competitions, pressuring rules from two different directions. (a) A competition exists 
between social orders that are, as it were, carriers of rules (as individual organisms are 
carriers of genes).  The rules give a social order a certain competitive advantage, but the 
rules are only selected insofar as they are part of the evolved social order of actions. (b) 
There is also a competition between individuals and groups within a social order, and this 
competition selects certain rules as conducive to individual/group success. 
 
5. Game Theoretic Modeling of Evolution 
Although Hayek and Darwin saw quite clearly the implications of their evolutionary 
approach to understanding human institutions, they lacked the analytical tools to fully 
explore their central insights.  Hayek’s goal, as we have seen, was to develop a dynamic 
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analysis of social evolution that could replace, what he considered, outmoded forms of 
social theory.  Advances in the understanding of biological evolution in the mid-twentieth 
century were combined with advances in mathematical techniques, most notably in game 
theory and the modeling of complex, dynamic systems.  The first development of the ideas 
that would become evolutionary game theory were made by, quite possibly, the most 
important biologist in the twentieth century, R.A. Fisher.  His work on sex ratios in The 
Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, a key book in the development of the modern 
evolutionary synthesis of genetics with natural selection, developed the basic idea of 
evolutionary equilibrium as a kind of competitive stability (1930).  Competitive stability 
could be modeled in game theoretic terms.  This insight led to the development of 
evolutionary game theory. 
 The irony, as John Maynard Smith points out on the opening page of his monumental 
Evolution and the Theory of Games is that “…game theory is more readily applied to 
biology than to the field of economic behavior for which it was originally designed” (1982, 
vii).  This is because the basic solution concept of traditional game theory, the Nash 
Equilibrium, has some drawbacks in terms of modeling individual rational strategic 
behavior.  As Maynard Smith notes, there are good reasons to doubt that humans will 
behave rationally in the way that traditional game theory suggests (1982, vii).  Furthermore, 
the unrealistic requirements of common knowledge required in traditional game theory 
makes it unsuitable as the basis of an empirical, prediction based science of human 
behavior  (Sugden, 1991).   
 Game theory, when applied to a biological context, however, is a powerful tool.  Instead 
of looking at what is a rational strategy for an individual agent to adopt, we look at stable 
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strategies across whole population.  This has several implications.  First, the payoffs to the 
game which were, in traditional game theory, the somewhat murky notions of individual 
utility, are transformed into the much more straightforward idea of replication rates.  
Successful strategies propagate themselves at a higher rate than unsuccessful strategies.  
This solves the perennial problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility by locating 
payoffs along a single dimension of reproductive success.  Second, the idea of a mixed-
strategy, a key component to the power of the Nash existence theorem (which shows that 
all finite games have at least one Nash equilibrium), was never well motivated in the case 
of individual single play games.  As many have pointed out, it is hard to see what rationally 
accessible reason a person could have for actually playing mixed-strategy equilibria (Pettit 
1996, 291-293). At the population level, however, this problem is solved by understanding 
mixed-strategies as populations divided into different strategies.  To have 1/3 of a 
population be composed of strategy A agents and 2/3 of the population be composed of 
strategy B agents makes sense in a way that an individual agent playing strategy A 1/3 of 
the time and strategy 2/3 of the time in a single-play game does not.  Third, the fundamental 
solution concept of evolutionary game theory, the “evolutionarily stable strategy” (ESS) 
seems more robust than the various solution concepts in traditional game theory.   
 The ESS is, again, based on looking at population level dynamics.  As Maynard Smith 
puts it, “evolutionary game theory is a way of thinking about evolution at the phenotypic 
level when fitness of particular phenotypes depend on their frequency in the population” 
(1982, 1).  In evolutionary game theory, phenotypes are represented as particular strategies.  
Each strategy has a given payoff in terms of fitness when paired against any other strategy 
in a population, including itself.  A strategy is an ESS if, as Herbert Gintis puts it, “…a 
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whole population using that strategy cannot be invaded by a small group with a mutant 
[phenotype]” (Gintis, 2009b, 229).  Similarly, a social “phenotype,” a set of social norms, 
rules, or practices, will be evolutionarily stable if a group of mutant innovators cannot 
move the entire population away from the equilibrium strategy.  
 To better see this, consider the classic Hawk-Dove game given in Figure 1: 
 Hawk Dove 
Hawk -5  
-5 
0 
 
10 
Dove 10  
0 
5 
 
5 
 
Figure 1: A Specific Hawk-Dove Game 
 
Suppose that Hawks and Doves are phenotypes in the population. A Hawk always battles 
for territory until either it is injured or its opponent retreats.  A Dove engages in display 
battle: if it meets a Hawk it quickly retreats without injury; if it meets another Dove, there 
is a .5 probability that it will retreat—in no case does it sustain injury. The expected payoff 
of a Hawk playing another Hawk is -5; the expected payoff of a Hawk meeting a Dove is 
10; the expected payoff of a Dove meeting a Hawk is 0; and the expected payoff of a Dove 
meeting a Dove is 5 with payoffs representing differential reproduction of the phenotype 
in the next generation.  Though the players do not vary their strategies (and so they cannot 
make “moves” in the sense of traditional game theory), we can understand the population 
as “moving” in the sense that, if being a Hawk has a higher expected payoff than being a 
Dove, the population will move towards more Hawks and fewer Doves. In evolutionary 
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terms we can think of this as a replicator dynamic in which those strategies that tend to 
have higher average payoffs increase in the population and so displace lower payoff 
strategies (Skyrms, 1996).  Neither an all-Hawk nor all-Dove is an evolutionary stable 
strategy. For a population of all Hawks the average expected payoff of the population is -
5; since a mutant Dove would have a payoff of 0 it would outperform the population 
average and increase. For a population of all Doves, the average population payoff is 5; a 
mutant Hawk would receive a payoff of 10, thus again outperforming the average of the 
Dove population.  An evolutionary stable equilibrium would be a mixed population evenly 
split between Doves and Hawks. At that mix the average Hawk and average Dove payoffs 
are the same (2½), and so neither population can grow at the expense of the other. This is 
equivalent is a Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies. 
 The basic tools of evolutionary game theory can be extremely powerful, allowing 
theorists to model the specific dynamics of different social evolutionary states in a way that 
Hayek could never have imagined.  Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue that 
evolutionary game theory is essential to a unified understanding of the social and 
behavioral sciences (Gintis, 2009a).  The basic hope is that, given this powerful analytical 
tool, social theorists can model the complex world of social interaction and the 
development of different social evolutionary equilibria.  Much work has already been done 
along these lines and evolutionary game theory has helped clarify important social 
practices like the development of social norms (Bicchieri, 2006), property in both animal 
and human populations (Gintis, 2007), and altruism (Trivers, 1971) among others.   
 
6. The Co-evolution of Genes and Culture 
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Another set of powerful formal models of cultural evolution based on population dynamics 
have been developed by Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson (1985, 2005).  Boyd and 
Richerson’s approach seeks “a systematic framework” accounting “for all the processes by 
which the distribution of beliefs, attitudes and values in a population are modified” (1985: 
11-12).  The aim is to model cultural evolution in terms of demographic dynamics, 
accounting for social, ecological and psychological processes.  On their analysis the forces 
of cultural evolution can be divided into (a) the inertial, (b) those that induce variation, and 
(c) those resulting form natural selection  (Richerson and Boyd, 2005, 68).  The inertial 
forces are those that induce towards stability, such as the accurate copying of ideas and 
models from one person to the next, which accurately replicate cultural forms.  In contrast, 
cultural factors that induce variation lead to cultural changes, and can be subdivided into 
random and decision-making variations. Random variations include, say, simple errors in 
copying cultural forms leading to mutations, as well as a cultural version of genetic drift 
(if a society has some skill that is practiced by a small group and, by chance, this group 
dies off in a generation, the society will loose that cultural form). Boyd and Richerson place 
great stress on decision-making factors that induce variation. What they call “guided 
variation” involve social learning and invention which are successfully reproduced. Some 
individual, confronting a problem, may discover a superior method that is then copied by 
others.  On their view, however,  a great amount of cultural variation stems from “biased 
transmission,” where certain sorts of cultural forms are more likely to be reproduced than 
others. For example, cultural ideas and practices practiced by high prestige individuals are 
more likely to be copied, as are more common forms, or simply those that are simpler and 
easier to remember.  
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 Fundamental to Boyd and Richerson’s view is the hypothesis of the co-evolution of 
culture and genes (see also Henrich and Henrich, 2007, chap. 2).  The variation of cultural 
forms is affected by their interaction with natural selection: cultural forms that have 
advantages in natural selection (say, language) can spread. According to the crucial 
coevolution thesis, the relation between natural selection and cultural evolution is 
reciprocal: natural selection primes us for some culture variations, which may be favored 
by natural selection, yet those cultural forms change the environment in which natural 
selection operates. 
 Boyd and Richerson’s account is straightforwardly selectionist, with selection 
operating at both individual and group levels, on both cultural and biological dimensions. 
Thus some cultural form (say, a new way of farming), may be selected because individuals 
who employ it are seen to do better, and so are copied by others, but also because groups 
that employ the method outperform groups that do not, and so eventually are copied by, or 
eliminate, other groups (Boyd and Richerson, 2005, chap. 11).  Furthermore, as we have 
just seen, a form may spread because it is seen as useful (and so selected by at the cultural 
level), but it may also spread because it gives those who use it a biological evolutionary 
advantage (and so selected by natural selection). 
 An especially important part of the work of Boyd, Richerson, as well as Gintis, Ernst 
Fehr and others has been the analysis of the evolution of cooperation in large groups (Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005, Part 3; Gintis, Bowels, Boyd, and Fehr, 2005; Henrich and Henrich, 
2007). In many ways the beginning of rigorous analysis of the evolution of cooperation 
was Robert Axelrod’s (1984) analysis of tit-for-tat in iterated prisoner’s dilemmas. Axelrod 
showed that if we model cooperation in terms of direct reciprocity (each person 
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reciprocates with other individuals who have cooperated with her, but refuses cooperation 
with those who have not cooperated with her), then strategies such as tit-for-tat can account 
for the evolution of cooperation among egoists. From the perspective of game theory 
Binmore (2005) has effectively shown that the family of possible strategies in equilibrium 
is much larger than tit-for-tat and its near variants.  The crucial findings of Boyd, Richerson 
and others, however, is that direct reciprocity, which places heavy information demands 
on those who employ it, is not a plausible model for the evolution of cooperation in large 
groups (Boyd and Richerson, 2005, chaps. 8-10; Henrich and Henrich, 2007, chaps. 6-7; 
Gaus, 2001, chap. 2). It seems that the most plausible hypothesis is that the evolution of 
large-scale human cooperation is best explained by the evolution of “altruistic punishers” 
or what might be called “rule-following punishers” — individuals who follow norms when 
most others do so, and who are also willing to expend resources to punish non-cooperators. 
Groups of such rule-following punishers outcompete groups composed of more egoist 
individuals and also resist invasion by defectors (Gaus, 2011, chap. 3).  This explanation 
show, if correct, provides an answer to the problem that Darwin posed in 1871 about the 
possibility of morals and cooperation evolving.  
 Despite the power of the co-evolutionary account of cultural evolution proposed by 
Boyd and Richerson, there is some controversy over what exactly an account of cultural 
evolution is about.  That is, what is culture and how is it transmitted.  In many ways, this 
controversy is the cultural evolutionary version of the traditional “levels of selection” 
debate in the philosophy of biology.  This debate arises because of the abstract nature of 
idea of natural selection.  This combined with the hierarchical nature of biological 
organisms and the complex nature of adaptation makes it unclear what should be 
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considered the replicator that is selected in certain cases (Okasha, 2001, Chap. 1).  The 
fuzzy nature of what constitutes culture, norms, principles, and social rules makes this 
problem even more acute. In his groundbreaking 1976 defense of gene level selection, The 
Selfish Gene, Dawkins first introduced the idea of the “meme” which acts as the analogue 
to the gene in social evolution (1976, Chap.11). Dawkins insists that cultural evolution is 
driven by gene-like memes at the genotypic level.   
 Dan Sperber proposes a model cultural evolution based on what he calls the 
“epidemiology of representations” (Sperber 1996, 1).  Sperber’s goal is to build a 
naturalistic theory of culture and its evolution through an epidemiological model that 
explains “population-scale macro phenomena…as the cumulative effect of micro-
processes” (Sperber 1996, 2).  Sperber disagrees with Dawkins and, to a certain extent, 
with Boyd and Richerson that cultural evolution can be understood along Darwinian lines.  
For Sperber, culture is made up of micro-level mental representations in the mind of all of 
the individuals within a social unit (Sperber 1996, 70-71).  Furthermore, “the human mind 
is susceptible to cultural representations in the same way as the human organism is 
susceptible to disease” (Sperber 1996, 57).  Some cultural representations are more 
“contagious” and have more staying power than others.  The debate between the Sperberian 
account of cultural evolution and Boyd and Richerson has many dimensions, but the main 
thread of the controversy is over the unit and process of cultural transmission.  Sperber 
argues that we need to understand the genotypic process of cultural evolution; in this case 
the mental representations of culture, to understand how culture changes and is maintained.  
Gene-culture co-evolution is “too slow a process” according to Sperber to explain cultural 
changes over the last couple of thousand years (Sperber 1996, 114).  Instead of co-
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evolution, we should focus on the psychological nature of the transmission and stability of 
representations from one person to another.  Following a theory of mental representations 
heavily informed by the work of Chomsky and Fodor, Sperber builds a basically 
“Lamarckian” account of social evolution from the inside out, that is, from the nature of 
genotypic mental representations to culture as a whole.  Boyd and Richerson, on the other 
hand, have developed a “Darwinian” model of social evolution that is more interested in 
explaining phenotypic selection while remaining silent on genotypic causes (Boyd and 
Richerson 2005, 80-81).  Far from privileging one approach over the other, it seems fruitful 
to pursue both lines of research simultaneously.  Either one will prove more explanatorily 
productive than the other or they will converge, in either case the pursuit will have been 
useful.   
 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
The study of the nature of social evolution is manifestation of the desire to understand 
where we came from and where we are headed.  In a more sophisticated form, it is as 
version of the Hegelian dream of being able to understand the laws of historical 
development.  To be able to see and understand the road that led from our Neolithic past 
to the present is also, to one degree or another, to have some insight into the shape of things 
to come.  A better understanding of the nature of social evolution is also important for 
political and moral philosophers because it can help draw the limits of the feasible while 
also reinforcing the contingency of our social and moral institutions.  The Hayekian insight 
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that the belief that we can reshape our social and moral institutions at will is nothing more 
than hubris is magnified and reinforced once we start to understand the processes that have 
created us and will continue to form us in the future.   
 We have also seen how much in this field is still unresolved.  The debate over 
competitive vs. cooperative evolution that was started in the nineteenth century is still 
raging.  Furthermore, this debate is also connected to the larger debate over the levels of 
selection and the possibility of group selection in biological and cultural evolution.  As we 
saw in §6, there is also still a debate over the relative importance of biological and cultural 
evolution proper over the development of culture.  In many ways, then, the field of social 
evolution is just beginning, with many different progressive research programs.   
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